Texto corresponde a la memoria de pruba para optar al grado de doctor en pedagogía Universdad Católica de Lovaina.

This article explores medical responsibility and negligence from an ethical and legal perspective within the Colombian context. It highlights causes of negligence such as deficiencies in professional training and organizational problems. The article emphasizes "objective imputation as key to determining the criminal responsibility of the physician" (Alvarado D. 2019). The objectives include analyzing the current legal framework in Colombia and assessing the link between medical ethics and legal responsibility. The methodology builds upon a thorough examination of specialized literature, including peer-reviewed (...) scientific articles in medicine and law, as well as legal documents and ethical regulations. A targeted search was conducted across various bibliographic databases including Google Scholar, Redalyc, Scielo, Dialnet, Biomed Central, Miguel De Cervantes Virtual Library, and BVS virtual health library. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito exponer la implementación y evaluación de un modelo de intervención grupal para personas con consumo problemático de drogas, el cual tiene como teoría de base la Biología de la Cognición y del Amar de Humberto Maturana. Hipotetizamos que mediante laimplementación de este modelo de terapia grupal disminuyen los niveles de depresión y ansiedad en las personas con consumo problemático de drogas. Es una investigación cuasi experimental pre-post con grupo de control, donde se exponen los (...) resultados de la muestra del Grupo Tratamiento, perteneciente a la Comunidad Terapéutica Padre Alberto Hurtado de Arica y del Grupo Control, el cual corresponde a la Comunidad Terapéutica La Tirana de AltoHospicio. Los resultados obtenidos muestran las diferencias significativas entre ambos grupos.The present article has as purpose to expose the implementation and evaluation of a model of group intervention for people with problematic consumption of drugs, which has as base theory the Biology of Cognition and of Love of Humberto Maturana; hypothesizing diminish the depression levels and anxiety in people with problematic consumption of drugs by means of thismodel’s of group therapy implementation. It is an quasi experimental research pre-post with control group, where the results of the sample of two Group Treatment are exposed, one belonging to the Therapeutic Community Padre Alberto Hurtado of Arica and the Group Control, which corresponds to the Therapeutic Community La Tirana at Alto Hospicio. The obtained results show significant differences between both groups. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza las relaciones entre el discurso ficcional y el discurso factual en las narrativas hispanoamericanas del siglo xix. En el análisis se considera que ambos discursos establecen una estrecha relación al interior de los textos que se han visto como parte de la literatura de ficción, así como en aquellos que se han clasificado como ensayísticos. Desde ahí se abre la posibilidad de analizar en términos narrativos obras que históricamente se han ubicado en un entre-medio de la crítica (...) historiográfica y la crítica literaria. El análisis propuesto considera el estudio de dos textos: El Periquillo Sarniento, de José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, y Mariluán, de Alberto Blest Gana. (shrink)

La equidad y la risaSobran, como ustedes saben, las anécdotas relativas a la particular índole del trabajo filosófico; pero quizá la más vieja de todas es la que recoge, unos seis siglos antes de Cristo, Esopo. Un astrónomo, cuenta Esopo, tenía la costumbre de salir todas las noches a observar las estrellas. Un día, caminando con toda su atención puesta en el cielo, cayó a un pozo. Alguien que pasó por allí oyó sus lamentos de dolor y al acercarse y (...) ver lo que le había ocurrido, dijo: ¡Pero .. (shrink)

El autor de este libro plantea varias interrogantes de enorme importancia para entender la historia reciente de nuestro país. ¿Cómo explicar la modernización económica de Chile durante la dictadura militar? ¿Cómo el liberalismo económico se instaló en nuestro país antes de la caída del muro de Berlín y de las experiencias conservadoras de Ronald Reagan y Margaret Thatcher? ¿Cuáles son los fenómenos que permitieron la aceptación de este modelo neoliberal? ¿De qué manera se gestaron las elites ..

La II Conferencia Internacional El lugar del archivo de las violencias de Estado: reorganizaciones del poder bajo el neoliberalismo se desarrolló los días 2, 3, 9 y 10 de septiembre de 2021. Fue organizada por el Proyecto Anillos de Investigación “Tecnologías Políticas de la memoria: usos y apropiaciones contemporáneas de artefactos de registro de la violencia política”, de la Universidad Alberto Hurtado, el Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos y la Universidad Austral de Chile. A su (...) vez, contó con la colaboración de Memoria Abierta (Argentina), el grupo de investigación “Representaciones contemporáneas de perpetración de crímenes de masas” (España) y el Núcleo Milenio Arte, Performatividad y Activismo (Chile). En ese marco y como parte del panel “Activismos y registros feministas”, se presentó la ponencia “Si una mujer avanza, ningún hombre retrocede”, desarrollada por el equipo de trabajo del proyecto Insumisas de Memoria Abierta. La presentación que, a continuación compartimos, estuvo a cargo de Maisa Bascuas, Victoria Daona y Nancy Lucero y fue moderada por Alejandra Oberti quien junto a Verónica Torras coordinan el proyecto. (shrink)

Con el presente libro se da razón del resultado investigativo y colaborativo que se realizó entre dos universidades chilenas, la Universidad Finis Terrae y la Universidad Alberto Hurtado, con cuatro universidades colombianas: la Universidad de La Salle (sede Bogotá), la Universidad Católica de Oriente, la Universidad Mariana de Pasto y la Universidad Católica de Pereira, en torno a la reflexión pedagógica y disciplinar que atañe a la educación religiosa escolar en ambos países. Esas disertaciones posibilitaron avanzar en la (...) investigación y hoy se reúnen en este texto, Intuiciones para el cultivo de la inteligencia espiritual en la Educación Religiosa Escolar desde la perspectiva de la libertad religiosa y de cultos. (shrink)

Shortly before and during World War II many European psychoanalysts found refuge in South America, concentrated in Buenos Aires. Here, together with local professionals, they created a strong, creative and productive psychoanalytic movement that in turn gave birth to theoretical and clinical contributions that transformed psychoanalysis, psychology, medicine and culture in South America. _The Pioneers of Psychoanalysis in South America_ is a collection of those pioneers’ papers, and introduces the reader to a body of ideas and advancements, many of which (...) have had limited and piecemeal exposure within the psychoanalytic community in the rest of the world until now. The editors Nydia Lisman-Pieczanski and Alberto Pieczanski present original papers and essays, many of which have never before been published in English; those that have been translated were rarely presented in context. Each one of the chapters is accompanied by a scholarly introduction written by psychoanalysts, many of whom personally knew the pioneers and their oeuvres in depth, tracing the roots of their ideas in the European analytic schools. _The Pioneers of Psychoanalysis in South America _is divided into six main sections: Psychoanalytic process Psychoanalytic technique Metapsychology Psychoanalysis of children Culture and society Psychosomatic medicine. Nydia Lisman-Pieczanski and Alberto Pieczanski provide a coherent guide to the seminal ideas and practices of the South American psychoanalysts who have made major theoretical and clinical contributions to the advancement of the psychoanalytic discipline. The chapters present the material in a way that is accessible to psychoanalysts from across the globe and will enable them to incorporate the ideas and practices outlined here into their everyday psychoanalytic work. It will also be of interest to psychoanalytic psychotherapists, academics interested in the history and development of psychoanalytic ideas and psychoanalysis, and advanced students. The following link leads to an video interview featuring Nydia Lisman-Pieczanski and Alberto Pieczanski by the Washington Center for Psychoanalysis for the History Project, where they open up about their stories, their marriage, and their new book: https://www.routledge.com/posts/8996. (shrink)

We address the issue of whether, why and under what conditions, quarantine and isolation are morally justified, with a particular focus on measures implemented in the developing world. We argue that the benefits of quarantine and isolation justify some level of coercion or compulsion by the state, but that the state should be able to provide the strongest justification possible for implementing such measures. While a constrained form of consequentialism might provide a justification for such public health interventions, we argue (...) that a stronger justification is provided by a principle of State Enforced Easy Rescue: a state may permissibly compel individuals to engage in activities that entail a small cost to them but a large benefit to others, because individuals have a moral duty of easy rescue to engage in those activities. The principle of State Enforced Easy Rescue gives rise to an Obligation Enforcement Requirement: the state should create the conditions such that submitting to coercive or compulsive measures becomes a fundamental moral duty of individuals, i.e. a duty of easy rescue. When the state can create such conditions, it has the strongest justification possible for implementing coercive or compulsive measures, because individuals have a moral duty to temporarily relinquish the rights that such measures would infringe. Our argument has significant implications for how public health emergencies in the developing world should be tackled. Where isolation and quarantine measures are necessary, states or the international community have a moral obligation to provide certain benefits to those quarantined or isolated. (shrink)

We argue that, from the point of view public health ethics, vaccination is significantly analogous to seat belt use in motor vehicles and that coercive vaccination policies are ethically justified for the same reasons why coercive seat belt laws are ethically justified. We start by taking seriously the small risk of vaccines’ side effects and the fact that such risks might need to be coercively imposed on individuals. If millions of individuals are vaccinated, even a very small risk of serious (...) side effects implies that, statistically, at some point side effects will occur. Imposing such risks raises issues about individual freedom to decide what risks to take on oneself or on one’s children and about attribution of responsibility in case of adverse side effects. Seat belt requirements raise many of the same ethical issues as vaccination requirements, and seat belt laws initially encountered some opposition from the public that is very similar to some of the current opposition to vaccine mandates. The analogy suggests that the risks of vaccines do not constitute strong enough reasons against coercive vaccination policies and that the same reasons that justify compulsory seat belt use—a measure now widely accepted and endorsed—also justify coercive vaccination policies. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...) of the properties by which a certain subject is seen in a given picture as having refers to the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, i.e., to the visible surface properties of that vehicle that are responsible for the fact that one such subject is seen in it, precisely taken in such a design role. Finally, I will try to show that seeing-in is qualified by inflection independently of whether it is conscious or unconscious seeing-in. (shrink)

We provide ethical criteria to establish when vaccine mandates for healthcare workers are ethically justifiable. The relevant criteria are the utility of the vaccine for healthcare workers, the utility for patients (both in terms of prevention of transmission of infection and reduction in staff shortage), and the existence of less restrictive alternatives that can achieve comparable benefits. Healthcare workers have professional obligations to promote the interests of patients that entail exposure to greater risks or infringement of autonomy than ordinary members (...) of the public. Thus, we argue that when vaccine mandates are justified on the basis of these criteria, they are not unfairly discriminatory and the level of coercion they involve is ethically acceptable—and indeed comparable to that already accepted in healthcare employment contracts. Such mandates might be justified even when general population mandates are not. Our conclusion is that, given current evidence, those ethical criteria justify mandates for influenza vaccination, but not COVID-19 vaccination, for healthcare workers. We extend our arguments to other vaccines. (shrink)

The range of opportunities people enjoy in life largely depends on social, biological, and genetic factors for which individuals are not responsible. Philosophical debates about equality of opportunities have focussed mainly on addressing social determinants of inequalities. However, the introduction of human bioenhancement should make us reconsider what our commitment to equality entails. We propose a way of improving morally relevant equality that is centred on what we consider a fair distribution of bioenhancements. In the first part, we identify three (...) main positions in the debate on bioenhancement and equality, and we show how each of them fails to meet the demands of a serious commitment to equality. In the second part, we formulate a new proposal that we think better promotes equality of opportunities: people from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds should be given access to bioenhancements while people from privileged socio-economic background should be prohibited from using them. We argue that those who are concerned about the inequality implications of bioenhancement should embrace this solution, rather than reject bioenhancement. (shrink)

Conflict of interests in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of (...) which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs. (shrink)

The debate around lockdowns as a response to the recent pandemic is typically framed in terms of a tension between freedom and health. However, on some views, protection of health or reduction of virus‐related risks can also contribute to freedom. Therefore, there might be no tension between freedom and health in public health restrictions. I argue that such views fail to appreciate the different understandings of freedom that are involved in the trade‐off between freedom and health. Grasping these distinctions would (...) allow to appreciate why different people give more weight to different aspects of limitations of freedom, including whether certain options are made simply risky or impossible, whether limitations of freedom are posed intentionally or happen accidentally, whether risks are beyond a threshold of acceptability, and who gets to decide that. I provide a conceptual analysis of the relationship between different types of freedom, public health policies, viruses and diseases. As I argue, identifying what freedom‐based reasons count for and against different types of public health restrictions requires distinguishing between viruses and diseases, between lockdowns and other types of restrictive policies, and between risks posed by viruses and threats of penalties involved by restrictive policies. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered (...) down’ counterpart recently defended by Tim Crane, according to which intentionality is just the necessary condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a heterogenous category. For there may be another mark of the mental, i.e., consciousness, in the phenomenological sense of the property of being experienced. (shrink)

The definition of love given by Descartes in the Passions of the Soul has never stopped puzzling commentators. If the first Cartesian textbooks discreetly evoke or even fail to discuss Descartes’s account of love, Spinoza harshly criticizes it, pointing out that it is ‘on all hands admitted to be very obscure’. More recently several scholars have noticed the puzzling character of the articles of the Passions of the Soul on love and hate. In this paper, I would like to propose (...) a reassessment of the definition of love provided by the Passions of the Soul and the Letters to Elisabeth and Chanut. By tracing back Descartes’s scholastic sources, I will demonstrate how Descartes builds up his definition of love by displacing or subverting the meaning of several major elements of the thomistic vulgata on love. Hence, a significant part of the obscurity of the definition given by the Passions of the Soul possibly finds its ultimate rationale in this attempt to recover some traditional questions of the scholastic debate on love, while advancing new answers to them. (shrink)

Many theories of racism presuppose that ordinary usage of the term “racism” should be preserved. Rarely is this presupposition—the presumption of conservatism—defended. This paper discusses the work of Lawrence Blum, Joshua Glasgow, Jorge Garcia, Tommie Shelby, and others, in order to develop a critique of the presumption of conservatism. Against this presumption, I defend the following desideratum: If ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties that can be averted by revising ordinary usage, then this counts as a mark against (...) the normative status of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising it. The significance of this argument is that it clears the way for a rigorous defense of revisionism. My paper provides a prima facie case for revisionism, built on two practical criticisms of the ordinary usage of “racism.” First, ordinary usage reflects incompatible norms that promote conceptual confusion and misunderstanding, among other problems. Second, ordinary usage reflects an individualistic conception of racism that serves the interests of whites. By championing ordinary usage in our philosophical theories, we (unwittingly) promote the interests of whites over nonwhites. (shrink)

We argue that we should provide extra payment not only for extra time worked but also for the extra risks healthcare workers (and those working in healthcare settings) incur while caring for COVID‐19 patients—and more generally when caring for patients poses them at significantly higher risks than normal. We argue that the extra payment is warranted regardless of whether healthcare workers have a professional obligation to provide such risky healthcare. Payment for risk would meet four essential ethical requirements. First, assuming (...) healthcare workers do not have a professional obligation to take on themselves the risks, payments in the form of incentives would preserve autonomy in deciding what risks to take on oneself. Second, even assuming that healthcare workers do have a professional obligation to take on themselves the risks, payments for risk would create fair working conditions by avoiding exploitation. Third, payments for risk would make it more likely that public healthcare systems can discharge their institutional responsibility to provide healthcare in circumstances where healthcare workers may otherwise (perhaps legitimately) opt out. Fourth, payments for risk would guarantee an efficient healthcare system in pandemic situations. Finally, we address two likely objections that some might raise against our proposal, particularly with regard to incentives, namely that such payments or incentives can themselves be coercive and that they represent a form of undue inducement. (shrink)

In this paper I want to hold, first, that one may suitably reconstruct the relevant kind of mental representational states that fiction typically involves, make-beliefs, as contextually unreal beliefs that, outside fiction, are either matched or non-matched by contextually real beliefs. Yet moreover, I want to claim that the kind of make-believe that may yield the mark of fictionality is not Kendall Walton’s invitation or prescription to imagine. Indeed, in order to appeal in terms of make-believe to a specific form (...) of imagination that fiction distinctively involves, one must move away from the realm of norms in order to attain a cognitive realm; namely, one must look at a specific form of metarepresentational state. This metarepresentational state of make-believe is a second-order representation that is about both real beliefs and make-beliefs, as the first-order representations it compares by acknowledging their contextual distinctness. (shrink)

We discuss whether and under what conditions people should be allowed to choose which COVID-19 vaccine to receive on the basis of personal ethical views. The problem arises primarily with regard to some religious groups’ concerns about the connection between certain COVID-19 vaccines and abortion. Vaccines currently approved in Western countries make use of foetal cell lines obtained from aborted foetuses either at the testing stage or at the development stage. The Catholic Church’s position is that, if there are alternatives, (...) Catholic people have a moral obligation to request the vaccine whose link with abortion is more remote, which at present means that they should refuse the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine. We argue that any consideration regarding free choice of the vaccine should apply to religious and non-religious claims alike, in order to avoid religion-based discrimination. However, we also argue that, in a context of limited availability, considering the significant differences in costs and effectiveness profile of the vaccines available, people should only be allowed to choose the preferred vaccine if: 1) this does not risk compromising vaccination strategies; and 2) they internalize any additional cost that their choice might entail. The State should only subsidize the vaccine that is more cost-effective for any demographic group from the point of view of public health strategies. (shrink)

We discuss the relationship between expertise, expert authority, and trust in the case of vaccine research and policy, with a particular focus on COVID-19 vaccines. We argue that expert authority is not merely an epistemic notion, but entails being trusted by the relevant public and is valuable if it is accompanied by expert trustworthiness. Trustworthiness requires, among other things, being transparent, acknowledging uncertainty and expert disagreement (e.g., around vaccines’ effectiveness and safety), being willing to revise views in response to new (...) evidence, and being clear about the values that underpin expert recommendations. We explore how failure to acknowledge expert disagreement and uncertainty can undermine trust in vaccination and public health experts, using expert recommendations around COVID-19 vaccines as a case study. (shrink)

Judges have a duty to decide judicial cases, however, judicial decision will vary and will have certain characteristics depending on the kind of case at hand: this article address three kinds of judicial cases: clear cases, borderline cases and pivotal cases. The purpose: discuss if relying on these classifications is useful or not in light of the unity in judicial adjudication principle.Resumen:Los jueces tienen el deber general de resolver los casos judiciales; sin embargo, la decisión judicial variará y tendrá ciertas (...) características dependiendo del tipo de caso; son tres los tipos de casos judiciales que este artículo estudia: clear cases, borderline cases y pivotal cases. El objetivo: intentar descubrir si adoptar una de las tipologías señaladas vulnera o reafirma el principio de unidad propio de la aplicación judicial. (shrink)

Ambientato nel Regno di Napoli del tardo Seicento, il saggio esplora la cultura dell'epoca attraverso la vicenda biografica dei membri dell'Accademia degli Investiganti, Tommaso Cornelio, Lucantonio Porzio, Francesco d'Andrea e Giuseppe Valletta. Attraverso l'analisi delle opere degli Investiganti, il testo mostra un quadro della loro riflessione filosofico-scientifica dovuta alla diffusione delle teorie atomistiche dei maggiori pensatori europei (Boyle, Descartes, Galilei, etc.) nei circoli partenopei--Back cover.

En el curso de 1929-1930, Los conceptos fundamentales de la metafísica, Heidegger presentó una famosa y controvertida tesis: la piedra es sin mundo, el animal es pobre de mundo y el ser humano es configurador de mundo. Durante mucho tiempo, en medio de diversas críticas e interpretaciones, ésta pasó como la palabra definitiva del pensador alemán respecto al problema de los animales y la vida. Sin embargo, cerca de una década después, en los Cuadernos negros, se presenta una reformulación crítica (...) de la conocida tesis, la cual había sido calificada por Heidegger como insuficiente. Este artículo tiene por objetivo analizar las diferencias entre ambas versiones, para evaluar sus implicaciones dentro del pensamiento heideggeriano y para las posibles críticas e interpretaciones; por ejemplo, la que en su momento ofreció Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

n un momento determinado de su historia, nuestra revista modificó el nombre. El leve cambio hecho se contempla aquí desde una doble perspectiva: 1. como justificación de lo abolido en ese título, y 2. como desafío y compromiso para lo conservado en él. ¿Por qué estos dos puntos de vista? Se impone el primero, porque nada podría autorizar el atribuirse la exclusividad en ser fieles a Tomás de Aquino. Y se reafirma hoy la opción por el segundo, porque, a zaga (...) de la huella del encuentro Habermas-Ratzinger de 2004, impresiona hondamente el hallar en recientes intervenciones, repetidas y notables, del Papa Benedicto XVI, un claro sentimiento de preocupación y un rico ofrecimiento de sugerencias. Una y otras, relativas a campos muy específicos y concretos de trabajo e investigación cosmológica, filosófica y teológica, en el terreno –importante y casi yermo– del diálogo entre ciencia y religión. A la postre, una vez más, veremos emerger una antiquísima fórmula de los incombustibles griegos, rememorada de tanto en tanto y de una u otra forma, a lo largo de los siglos. También en nuestros días.The journal altered its name in a fixed moment of its history. The slight change made in 1970 is seen here under a double perspective. First, like a justification of the abolished in that title. Second, like a challenge and a commitment of the maintained in it. Why these two viewpoints? The first prevails because nothing could authorize claiming exclusiveness in being faithful to Thomas Aquinas. And the option for the second is reaffirmed today, because after the track of Habermas-Ratzinger’s meeting in 2004, it is deeply impressive to find, in recent, repeated and notable Pope Benedictus XVI’s interventions, a clear feeling of preoccupation and a rich offering of suggestions. One and the others are relative to very specific and concrete fields of work and cosmological, philosophical and theological investigation on the important and almost barren ground of the dialogue between science and religion. At the end, once more, we will see emerge an ancient formula of the ever present Greeks remembered from time to time and one way or another along the centuries, nowadays, too. (shrink)

As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...) the above phenomenal character, or it is a sui generis phenomenal property, thereby giving its own contribution to the overall phenomenal character of that state. Yet neither way sounds ultimately satisfying. For the indirect way may work only under the assumption that intentionality is monadic. Since the direct way explicitly endorses this assumption, the indirect way must give pride of place to it. Yet the direct way seems to be unsuccessful, in any of its forms. Thus, the phenomenal intentionality research program ought to give way to another research program concerning intentionality. (shrink)

According to an intuitive claim, in saying that one sees a picture's subject, i.e., what a picture presents, in the picture's vehicle, i.e., the picture's physical basis, by ‘in’ one does not mean the spatial relation of being in, as holding between such items in the real space. For the picture's subject is knowingly not in the real space where one veridically sees the picture's vehicle. Some theories of pictorial experience have actually agreed with this intuition by claiming that the (...) picture's subject lies in a pictorial space of its own, disconnected from the real space that includes the picture's vehicle. Yet, not only linguistic evidence suggests that when used as above, ‘in’ means precisely that very relation, but an appropriate theory of pictorial experience can justify the above claim. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 9, September 2020, Page 62-65.

Conscience is typically invoked in healthcare to defend a right to conscientious objection, that is, the refusal by healthcare professionals to perform certain activities in the name of personal moral or religious views. On this approach, freedom of conscience should be respected when the individual is operating in a professional capacity. Others would argue, however, that a conscientious professional is one who can set aside one’s own moral or religious views when they conflict with professional obligations. The debate on conscientious (...) objection has by and large crystallised around these two positions, with compromise positions aiming at striking a balance between the two, for instance, by arguing for referral requirements by objecting healthcare professionals.In this article, I suggest that the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare could benefit from being reframed as a problem around demandingness rather than one about freedom of conscience and moral integrity. Being a professional, and a healthcare professional specifically, typically requires taking on additional burdens compared with non-professionals. For instance, healthcare professionals are expected to take on themselves higher risks than the rest of the population. However, it is also widely agreed that there are limits to the additional risks and burdens that healthcare professionals should be expected to take on themselves. Thus, a question worth exploring is whether, among the extra burdens that healthcare professionals should be expected to take on themselves as a matter of professional obligation, there is the burden of acting against one’s own conscience. (shrink)

Within a general approach that implies the closely related survey of neurosciences and philosophical thought, the essays collected in the volume develop two main lines of research. The first one, thanks to the contributions of scientists and psychologists , psychoanalysists and bioengineers , allows to fix the attention on the neurobiological, psychological, psychoanalytical and physical remembering. The second one, more specifically philosophical, is declined in three different approaches. the first - with essays by Stefania Achella, Giuseppe D'Anna and Rosario Diana (...) - points to the anlysis of the role played by the rememberance and the prefiguration in the processes of identity construction. The second - with contributions from Fiorella Battaglia, Anna Donise, Sabine Marienberg and Sara Fortuna - focuses on the role of remembering in anthropology and linguistics, as well as the identification of certain diseases of memory. The third, finally - with contributions from Gabriella Baptist, Chiara de Luzenberger and Marco Boninu - tends to define the regulatory function of memory. (shrink)

The present study is based on the work by Sara Maitland entitled A Book of Silence and seeks to reflect on this theme in the line of high spirituality by crossing it with the figures of the imaginary that form the silence itself. To this end, we seek in the first part, devoted to silence, to understand the nature of silence in its manifestations, types and images, as it was thought and studied by Sara Maitland in her A Book of (...) Silence. Then, in the second part, reflect on the meaning of this constellation of images to try to delineate the imaginary of silence. In the third part, taking into account the developments of the first and second parts, we will reflect on the trilogy of silence-imaginary-creativity. We will conclude with some reflections and questions raised by the analysis of the author’s work. (shrink)